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.JUSTICE THURGOOO MARSHALL January 14, 1977 
Re: No. 75-812. Codd v. Velger 
Dear Bill: 
Your opinion for the Court faithfully reflects the 
conclusions of the Conference majority. of which I was a 
part. Seeing it in writing, however. has suggested some 
problems with which we did not deal. 
The basic problem involves the relationship among 
the burdens of pleading and proof and the nature of the available 
remedy. The opinion holds. I take it, that a plaintiff seeking 
a federal court order that he be given a Roth hearing must 
allege that the stigmatizing information in his file is false or 
substantially misleading. This requirement is justified 
because there is no sense in a court ordering a hearing which 
it has no reason to believe will accomplish anything. On the 
other hand, if the accuracy of the plaintiff's allegation of falsity 
is considered at issue before the district court. the court 
proceeding will cover the same ground as the Roth hearing would 
cover. Litigating the accuracy of information in order to establish 
a right to a hearing on the accuracy of that same inforn1ation n1akes 
no sense to me. 
These considerations lead 1ne to conclude that when a 
plaintiff seeks a belated Roth hearing, the burden of pleading 
discussed in your opinion must carry with it no concon1itant 
burden of production or persuasion. If this conclusion is correct. 
I think the opinion should say so explicitly since ordinarily a 
plaintiff must prove what he must plead. 
A different conclusion follows in this case since the 
plaintiff seeks not a hearing but rather damages and injunctive relief 
under § 1983. (Presumably, the only appropriate equitable relief 
would be expungernent.) Such relief 1s available because the lilniled 
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J purpose of the hearing required by the Fourteenth Amendment does not limit the remedies provided by § 1983 to compensate 
for injuries caused by an earlier denial of that Fourteenth 
Amendment right. But to prove his claim to that relief. a 
plaintiff would have to show that the stigmatizing material whose 
circulation injured him was false or substantially misleading. 
Otherwise. he would not have suffered injury from denial of 
the Roth hearing. 
If you can accommodate these suggestions. I will be glad 
to join. 
Sincerely. 
111 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
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